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I’m going to use the year 1993 as the focal point of my talk.  Obviously, the Ohio 
Supreme Court had used its own constitution as the basis of decisions many times 
before that, but that’s when the court expressly joined the New Judicial Federalism 
Movement.  The official announcement, so to speak, came in the syllabus of Arnold 
v. Cleveland,2 authored by Justice Andy Douglas.  He wrote: 
A noticeable trend has recently emerged among state courts.  It appears 
that more state courts are increasingly relying on their constitutions when 
examining personal rights and liberties. . . . In joining the growing trend 
in other states, we believe that the Ohio Constitution is a document of 
independent force.  In the areas of individual rights and civil liberties, the 
United States Constitution, where applicable to the states, provides a floor 
below which state court decisions may not fall.  As long as state courts 
provide at least as much protection as the United States Supreme Court 
has provided in its interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights, state courts 
are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections to 
individuals and groups.3 
Just as an aside, it is quite interesting that the Arnold case is the one in which 
Ohio joined the New Judicial Federalism Movement, because the case itself dealt 
with the right to bear arms.4  A challenge was brought under the Ohio Constitution to 
a Cleveland ordinance that banned the possession and sale of assault weapons in the 
city.5  The court noted that unlike the Second Amendment,6 the right to bear arms in 
                                                                
1Visiting Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati.  All Rights Reserved. 
267 Ohio St. 3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993). 
3Id. at 42, 616 N.E.2d at 168-69 (emphasis added). 
4Id. at 39, 616 N.E.2d at 166. 
5Id. at 39, 616 N.E.2d at 166. 
6
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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Ohio is a personal, not a collective right,7 but subject to reasonable regulation.8  The 
court held that the ban on that limited category of weapon was a reasonable exercise 
of the police power.9  
As I’m sure everyone knows, this issue was just argued to the Ohio Supreme 
Court in the concealed carry case, where the concealed carry law was challenged 
solely on state constitutional grounds.10  But back to the big picture. 
I’m going to talk about the approaches the court has taken since it announced it 
was joining the New Judicial Federalism Movement in 1993.  Although different 
nomenclature is used, there is generally thought to be three approaches to state 
constitutional analysis. I like the language Professor Jennifer Friesen uses in her 
book on state constitutional law.11 
First is the lockstep approach. Here, the state court does not deviate in any way 
from U.S. Supreme Court analysis and precedent when interpreting state 
constitutional provisions that are analogous to federal provisions. 
Second is the reactive posture, or what Professor Friesen calls the 
“supplemental/independent method.”12  I like to call this the selective independent 
posture.  Here’s what Professor Friesen has to say about this approach: 
The supplemental approach treats state constitutional rights as 
supplemental to a federal benchmark, necessary only when the federal law 
does not protect the right asserted.  In application this means that the 
current federal doctrine is treated as the presumptively correct standard for 
state law as well, except when the state court finds persuasive reasons to 
“depart” or “diverge” from the Supreme Court, or fill in gaps left by its 
opinions.13 
So, here a state generally follows federal precedent, but grants more rights under 
its own constitution in certain limited instances.  Under this approach, federal law is 
analyzed first. 
Finally, there is the “beyond reactive,” or again, in Professor Friesen’s terms, the 
“primacy” method.14  Here, the state court engages in a truly separate and 
independent state constitutional analysis, and analyzes state law first.  With this 
approach, Professor Friesen asserts, the state should look to its “common law history, 
                                                                
7
“The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security[.]”  OHIO CONST. 
art. I, § 4. 
8Arnold, 67 Ohio St. 3d at 43, 45-46, 616 N.E.2d at 169, 171. 
9Id. at syllabus ¶ 3. 
10See Klein v. Leis, 99 Ohio St. 3d 537, 795 N.E.2d 633 (2003) (holding that there is no 
constitutional right to bear concealed weapons). 
111 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, 
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (3d ed. 2000). 
12Id. at § 1-6(c). 
13Id. at §§ 1-45, 1-46 (internal footnotes omitted). 
14Id. at § 1-6(a).  
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state history, state policy, and constitutional structure as sources for independent 
interpretation.”15  Federal precedent is relevant but not binding.16 
OK, so whither Ohio?  I have three contentions.  First, despite the bold 
announcement in Arnold, the court takes awhile to “get” it—except for Justice Craig 
Wright, who got it right away and is really the leader of this movement, and the most 
sophisticated analyst.  
Second, on the criminal law side of the ledger, especially in the area of search 
and seizure, the court has intentionally chosen to remain in lockstep with federal 
precedent, because of the conservative bent of a majority of the justices about the 
rights of criminal defendants. 
Finally, on the civil side, the court has been more willing to sally forth—but even 
when heading beyond the lockstep approach, it has not really engaged in the kind of 
meaningful analysis that Professor Friesen suggests should characterize these 
approaches.  It has used more of what I call the “magic wand” view—simply an 
announcement that Ohio is taking a different position.  Justice Pfeifer has replaced 
Justice Wright as the heir to the New Judicial Federalism Movement, but is a less 
thorough analyst. 
After Arnold, we’re going to see some to-ing and fro-ing.  I’ve chosen as 
examples cases involving speech and the press, searches and seizures, and religion.   
I.  SPEECH AND THE PRESS 
A.  Defamation 
It’s always useful in these analyses to start by looking at a comparison of the 
constitutional language.  Identical language doesn’t always mean lockstep is going to 
be the approach, nor does different language mean independent analysis.  Still, it’s a 
good place to start.  With speech and the press, we are comparing the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution17 with Article I, Section 11 of the Ohio 
Constitution.18 
First, let’s look at defamation—an area where I think the court almost 
accidentally fell into a beyond reactive posture.  The court’s defamation 
jurisprudence can be seen as very, very bold, or as overly deferential to the media, 
depending on one’s viewpoint. 
The court’s view emerged before Arnold from the companion cases of a 
wrestling coach named Milkovich, a school superintendent named Scott, and the 
Willoughby News Herald newspaper.19  The question was whether a sportswriter for 
the newspaper defamed the coach and the superintendent in his column. 
                                                                
15Id. at § 1-42. 
16Id. at § 1-41. 
17
“Congress shall make no law … abridging freedom of speech or of the press. . . .”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
18
“Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being 
responsible for the abuse of that right, and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the 
liberty of speech, or of the press.”  OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11. 
19Milkovich v. News Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984); Scott v. News 
Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986). 
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The coach and the superintendent each sued the paper separately, and each case 
got to the Ohio Supreme Court separately.  In both cases, the media argued that the 
column was an opinion and was therefore absolutely protected under federal law.20  
In Milkovich’s case, which reached the Ohio Supreme Court first, the court rejected 
that argument, and decided the case on the private figure/negligence basis.21  The 
case was reversed and remanded.22 
In Scott’s case, which reached the Ohio Supreme Court two years and one 
election later, the court overruled Milkovich, declared school superintendent Scott a 
public figure, and held the article to be opinion—which, as such, was absolutely 
protected, both by Article I, Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution as a proper exercise 
of freedom of the press, and by the First Amendment.23  It is worth noting that this 
was intended as the lockstep approach, but was an incorrect interpretation of federal 
law.  Because of this, the Ohio Supreme Court is going to fall into a beyond reactive 
posture. 
Meanwhile, the Milkovich case, which had been reversed and remanded, was re-
decided in favor of the media, based on the opinion privilege set forth in Scott.24  The 
U.S. Supreme Court accepted review of Milkovich and told the Ohio Supreme Court 
in no uncertain terms that there is no separate opinion privilege under federal 
constitutional law.25  The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the actual malice standard 
of New York Times v. Sullivan26 as striking the proper balance between freedom of 
the press and the protection of the reputation of public persons, and determined that 
the language in the article was actionable.27  
So what lesson does the Ohio Supreme Court take from this U.S. Supreme Court 
rebuke in Milkovich?  That it could avoid rebuke by truly relying on its own state 
constitution.  It’s going to move away from lockstep and chose affirmatively to find 
a different interpretation under state law. 
Let’s move to the post-Arnold world of defamation.  The case is Vail v. Plain 
Dealer Publishing Company;28 the year, 1995.  Cleveland Plain Dealer columnist Joe 
Dirk wrote some very dicey things about state senatorial candidate Loren Vail.29  
Vail sued the newspaper for defamation.  The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the 
dismissal of the case against the Plain Dealer on the basis of the opinion privilege it 
had first announced in Scott.30  What about the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
                                                                
20Milkovich, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 298, 473 N.E.2d at 1196; Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 244, 496 
N.E.2d at 701. 
21Milkovich, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 296-99, 473 N.E.2d at 1195-97. 
22Id. at 299, 473 N.E.2d at 1197. 
23Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 247-48, 254, 496 N.E.2d at 704, 709. 
24Milkovich v. News-Herald, 46 Ohio App. 3d 20, 545 N.E.2d 1320 (1989). 
25Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 24 (1990). 
26Id. at 16 (referring to New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)). 
27Id. at 3. 
2872 Ohio St. 3d 279, 649 N.E.2d 182 (1995). 
29Id. at 282-83, 649 N.E.2d at 186. 
30Id. at 281, 649 N.E.2d at 185. 
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Milkovich?  The Vail court unapologetically concedes it may have been wrong in its 
interpretation of federal law, but emphatically reaffirms the opinion privilege under 
state law.31  
Chief Justice Moyer, who authored the majority opinion, had this to say:  
“Regardless of the outcome in Milkovich, the law in this state is that embodied in Scott.  
The Ohio Constitution provides a separate and independent guarantee of protection for 
opinion ancillary to freedom of the press.”32  He went on to hold the column was 
protected opinion as a matter of law.33 
I want to highlight the separate concurrence of Justice Wright in this case 
because he is the most consistent voice for the “beyond lockstep” approach to the 
New Judicial Federalism.  He said:  
I write separately not out of disagreement with some aspect of the Chief 
Justice’s opinion, but to stress its stated underpinnings—Section 11, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  Time and again, but never more clearly 
than today, we have stressed that the protections accorded opinion under 
the Ohio Constitution are broader than the First Amendment jurisprudence 
developed by the United States Supreme Court.34 
Justice Pfeifer, although concurring in the judgment, chided the court for relying 
on nothing more than a “naked assertion that Section 11, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution provides greater protection for the publishing of opinions than the First 
Amendment to the federal Constitution.”35  He believes that the Ohio Constitution is 
actually stricter about abuses of the rights of free speech than the First Amendment.36 
After Vail, the question remained as to whether this separate opinion privilege 
was just for the media.  The answer came in 2001 in Wampler v. Higgins,37 in which 
the court held that “[t]he Ohio Constitution’s separate and independent protection for 
opinions recognized in Scott . . . and reaffirmed in Vail, is not limited in its 
application to the allegedly defamatory statements made by media defendants[.]”38  
B.  Ethnic Intimidation 
Remember this talk is called a little to-ing and a little fro-ing.  We’ve seen the to-
ing.  Now for a little fro-ing, where the court has not been quite so bold in striking 
out on its own.  Let’s look at ethnic intimidation, which I see as a toe in the “beyond 
reactive” water, pulled out quickly when it gets burned.  The case is State v. Wyant.39  
At issue was a state law that created a penalty enhancement when certain menacing 
                                                                
31Id. at 281, 649 N.E.2d at 185. 
32Id. at 281, 649 N.E.2d at 185. 
33Id. at 283, 649 N.E.2d at 186. 
34Id. at 284, 649 N.E.2d at 187 (Wright, J., concurring). 
35Id. at 285, 649 N.E.2d at 188 (Pfeiffer, J., concurring). 
36Id. at 285-86, 649 N.E.2d at 188 (Pfeifer, J., concurring). 
3793 Ohio St. 3d 111, 752 N.E.2d 962 (2001). 
38Id. at syllabus. 
3964 Ohio St. 3d 566, 597 N.E.2d 450 (1992) (hereinafter Wyant I). 
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crimes were committed because of the race, color, religion, or national origin of the 
victim.40  The predicate offenses were already crimes.41  The Ohio Supreme Court 
held that the effect of the ethnic intimidation statute was to create a “thought crime” 
in violation of Article I, Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution, and the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.42  Certiorari was granted 
in this case by the U.S. Supreme Court,43 along with a number of other state ethnic 
intimidation cases. 
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Wisconsin’s similar ethnic intimidation 
statute in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,44 holding that a penalty enhancement increases 
punishment for conduct, and does not impermissibly punish thought.45  The U.S. 
Supreme Court sent Wyant back to the Ohio Supreme Court for reconsideration in 
light of its holding in Mitchell.46 
What happened in Wyant II?47  The court meekly retreated to lockstep. Here’s the 
whole decision.  “For the reasons stated in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, we vacate our 
opinion in State v. Wyant and uphold the constitutionality of the ethnic intimidation 
law, under both the United States and Ohio Constitutions.”48  This drew a strong 
dissent by Justice Wright, joined by Justice Pfeifer.  “Today, sad to say, we have 
beaten a hasty retreat from our previous pronouncement in this very case. . . .”49 
Whether or not the Mitchell decision dictates that “[Ohio’s ethnic intimidation 
statute] be held constitutional under the First Amendment, I believe that it is 
unconstitutional under Section 11, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  As we said in 
Wyant I, ‘the Constitution of Ohio is even more specific [than the First Amendment]; 
it guarantees to every citizen freedom to ‘speak, write and publish his sentiments on 
all subjects.’”50 
“Because the Ohio Constitution provides a more expansive protection for 
freedom of speech than does the United States Constitution, nothing in the Mitchell 
decision alters our conclusion in Wyant I that [Ohio’s ethnic intimidation statute] 
violates the Ohio Constitution. . . .”51 
                                                                
40OHIO REV. CODE § 2927.12 (1987). 
41Wyant I, 64 Ohio St. 3d at 570-71, 597 N.E.2d at 453. 
42Id. at syllabus.  
43Ohio v. Wyant, 508 U.S. 969 (1993). 
44508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
45Id. at 487-88. 
46Remand from the United States Supreme Court, No. 92-568. 
47State v. Wyant, 68 Ohio St. 3d 162, 624 N.E.2d 722 (1994) (hereinafter Wyant II). 
48Id. at 164, 624 N.E.2d at 724. 
49Id. at 164, 624 N.E.2d at 724 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
50Id. at 167, 624 N.E.2d at 726 (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting Wyant I, 64 Ohio St. 3d at 
577, 597 N.E.2d at 457). 
51Id. at 168, 624 N.E.2d at 727 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
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C.  Speech on Private Shopping Mall Property 
Next, let’s turn to speech on private property.  The case is Eastwood Mall v. 
Slanco.52  The year is 1994, which is after Arnold, before Vail, and the same year as 
the Wyant remand.  The issue is whether a private shopping mall can constitutionally 
ban all handbilling, picketing, soliciting, and other similar activities done on its 
property without its permission.53  Federal precedent at this time is yes, it can.54  The 
Ohio Supreme Court chooses lockstep and also answers yes, holding that Article I, 
Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution is no broader on this point than the federal First 
Amendment.55  This again is over a strong dissent by Justice Wright: 
It seems to me this court has taken one step forward but two steps 
backward in recent cases involving interpretation of the Ohio 
Constitution.  The step forward occurred in Arnold v. Cleveland, when we 
recognized the independent force of the Ohio Constitution.  However, in 
less than one year, this Court took a substantial step backwards in State v. 
Wyant, when this Court failed even to address the “independent force” of 
the Ohio Constitution as applied to the constitutionality of the ethnic 
intimidation statute. Unhappily, a second step to the rear occurs today.  In 
the present case, Section 11, Article I of the Ohio Constitution loses much 
of its independent force and appears as a mere shadow of the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Because I support the view 
that “the Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force” and 
believe that Section 11, Article I affords Ohio citizens greater civil 
liberties and protections than does the First Amendment, I must 
vigorously dissent. . . .56 
As a point of comparison, when the state of California was confronted with this 
same issue in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center,57 the California Supreme Court 
struck down the anti-handbilling injunction, holding that the California Constitution 
protects speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers, even 
when the centers are privately owned.58  
II.  SEARCH AND SEIZURE—LOCKSTEP ON PURPOSE 
The language of the Fourth Amendment and of Article I, Section 14 is virtually 
identical.59  While there have been a few aberrant “beyond lockstep” decisions, the 
                                                                
5268 Ohio St. 3d 221, 626 N.E.2d 59 (1994). 
53Id. at 222, 626 N.E.2d at 60. 
54Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
55Eastwood Mall, 68 Ohio St. 3d at 223, 626 N.E.2d at 61. 
56Id. at 225, 626 N.E.2d at 62 (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting Arnold, 67 Ohio St. 3d at 
42, 616 N.E.2d at 169). 
57592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
58592 P.2d at 347. 
59The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
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Ohio Supreme Court has reined them in and has opted for a clear and intentional 
policy of what it calls “harmonization” in this field. 
In 1984, in State v. Burkholder,60 the court held that under the Ohio Constitution, 
evidence obtained through an unreasonable or unlawful search and seizure is 
inadmissible in a probation violation proceeding.61  However, twelve years later, in 
1996, in State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority,62 the court expressly 
overruled Burkholder and held that evidence obtained through an unreasonable or 
unlawful search and seizure is generally admissible in both probation and parole 
revocation proceedings.63  The Wright court criticized Burkholder for failing to 
recognize that the Ohio Constitution should be “interpreted to protect the same 
interests and in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment.”64 
In 1992, relying on both the state and federal constitutions, the court held in State 
v. Brown65 that a police officer may not open a small closed container found inside 
the glove compartment solely as a search incident to the driver’s arrest for a traffic 
violation, after the officer has the suspect and sole occupant of the vehicle under 
control in the police cruiser.66  In April of 2002, in State v. Murrell,67 the court 
expressly overruled Brown, holding that when a police officer has made a lawful 
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that 
automobile.68  In her majority opinion in Murrell, Justice Resnick wrote that the 
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio 
Constitution are to be  “harmonized.”69 
And finally, I will discuss the Robinette cases, which I think had the most drastic 
ramifications for Ohio’s approach to the New Judicial Federalism.  
                                                          
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.   
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the person and things to be seized.   
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14.   
6012 Ohio St. 3d 205, 466 N.E.2d 176 (1984). 
61Id. at 206, 466 N.E.2d at 178. 
6275 Ohio St. 3d 82, 661 N.E.2d 728 (1996). 
63Id. at 91, 661 N.E.2d at 735. 
64Id. at 88, 661 N.E.2d at 733. 
6563 Ohio St. 3d 349, 588 N.E.2d 113 (1992). 
66Id. at 353, 588 N.E.2d at 116. 
6794 Ohio St. 3d 489, 764 N.E.2d 986 (2002). 
68Id. at 496, 764 N.E.2d at 993. 
69Id. at 495-96, 764 N.E.2d at 993. 
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In 1995, the Ohio Supreme Court decided the first of the Robinette cases.70  This 
was a routine traffic stop case.71  The court, in a decision authored by Justice Pfeifer, 
upheld the suppression of drugs found in the car following an ostensibly consensual 
search.72  The court formulated a new rule that after a valid detention, before any 
interrogation could be deemed consensual, the citizen had to be told that he/she was 
free to go73 (later referred to by Justice Ginsburg as the first-tell-then-ask test).74  The 
court held this outcome was guaranteed by the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions (much as 
it had done with the opinion privilege in Scott).75 
The U.S. Supreme Court accepted review of this case,76 which it could not have 
done had the case been decided on truly adequate and independent state grounds.77  
The high court gave short shrift to the independent state grounds alleged in the 
syllabus, holding that despite that statement, the entire analysis and underpinning of 
the decision was federal law.78 
Just as it had done in Milkovich, the U.S. Supreme Court again rebuked the Ohio 
Supreme Court, telling the Ohio court that it had wrongly interpreted federal law.79  
The case was reversed and remanded,80 with profound effect on Justice Pfeifer, as I 
will discuss.  I think he took this rebuke very much to heart, and he emerged as the 
champion of the New Judicial Federalism after Justice Wright’s retirement, which 
took place after Robinette was remanded. 
When the case came back to the Ohio Supreme Court, the court could have 
chosen either to analyze the case on truly adequate, independent state grounds or to 
apply the federal test for consent correctly.  Just as it had done in Wyant, the ethnic 
intimidation case, the court chose to follow federal law, and declined to reexamine 
its earlier decision on independent state grounds.81  Justice Wright was no longer on 
the court to tweak his colleagues.  The court vacated the first-tell-then-ask holding of 
Robinette I’s syllabus, and held that “under Section 14, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution, the totality-of-the-circumstances test [which is the federal test82] is 
                                                                
70State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 653 N.E.2d 695 (1995) (hereinafter Robinette I), 
rev’d, 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 
71Robinette I, 73 Ohio St. 3d at 653-54, 653 N.E.2d at 698. 
72Id. at syllabus ¶ 1. 
73Id. at syllabus ¶ 2. 
74Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41 (1996) (hereinafter Robinette II) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring).   
75Robinette I, 73 Ohio St. 3d at 655, 653 N.E.2d at 699. 
76Ohio v. Robinette, 516 U.S. 1157 (1996).   
77Robinette II, 519 U.S. at 36-37; see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
78Robinette II, 519 U.S. at 36. 
79Id. at 39-40. 
80Id. at 40. 
81State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St. 3d 234, 237-39, 685 N.E.2d 762, 766-67 (1997) 
(hereinafter Robinette III). 
82Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
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controlling in an unlawful detention to determine whether permission to search a 
vehicle is voluntary.”83  The court did go on to find that even under this test, 
Robinette’s consent had not been voluntary.84 
Here are some concluding observations from Robinette III about the New Judicial 
Federalism from Justice Stratton’s majority opinion:  “Despite this wave of New 
Federalism, where the provisions are similar and no persuasive reason for a differing 
interpretation is presented, this court has determined that protections afforded by 
Ohio's Constitution are coextensive with those provided by the United States 
Constitution.”85 
Thus, case law indicates that, consistent with Robinette II, “we should harmonize 
our interpretation of Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution with the Fourth 
Amendment, unless there are persuasive reasons to find otherwise.”86 
After showing no inclination to depart from harmonization in this area, in the 
summer of 2003 the Court upheld the suppression of crack cocaine obtained from a 
custodial search following an arrest for jaywalking.87  The Court held that a full 
custodial arrest for a minor misdemeanor ran afoul of the state Constitution, holding 
that Section 14, Article I provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment 
against warrantless arrests for minor misdemeanors.88  While this is an important 
exception, harmonization remains the stated policy in the area of search and 
seizure.89 
III.  SCHOOL VOUCHERS 
After Robinette comes the school voucher decision, Simmons-Harris v. Goff.90  
To me, this case represents the court’s most disappointing failure to do a thorough 
independent state constitutional analysis—which I believe would have warranted a 
different result in the case, but that’s another talk.  For comparison, I would like to 
point to the analysis in Holmes v. Bush,91 in which a Leon County, Florida trial judge 
held that the Florida school voucher program violated the state constitution.92 
Let’s come back to Ohio.  There were many challenges to the school voucher 
program.  I will talk here only about the religion challenges.  There were two under 
the Ohio Constitution—one under the school funds clause (Article VI, Section 2),93 
                                                                
83Robinette III, 80 Ohio St. 3d at 245, 685 N.E.2d at 771. 
84Id. at 246, 685 N.E.2d at 771-72. 
85Id. at 238, 685 N.E.2d at 766. 
86Id. at 239, 685 N.E.2d at 767. 
87State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 323 (2003). 
88Id. at syllabus. 
89Id. 
9086 Ohio St. 3d 1, 711 N.E.2d 203 (1999). 
91No. CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2002). 
92Id. at *3. 
93
“[N]o religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control 
of, any part of the school funds of this state.”  OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
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the other under Ohio’s ban on religious establishment (Article I, Section 7).94  The 
primary challenge, of course, was under the Establishment Clause of the federal First 
Amendment.95  Justice Pfeifer authored this rather curious opinion (which has no 
syllabus, and was actually decided under the arcane single-subject rule).  
The court found no violation of any of the religion clauses, state or federal.96  As 
for the school funds challenge, the court used a neutrality analysis that carried the 
day when a separate challenge later reached the U.S Supreme Court.97  As for the 
challenge under the state establishment clause equivalent, the Ohio Supreme Court 
said this: 
This court has had little cause to examine the Establishment Clause of our 
own Constitution and has never enunciated a standard for determining 
whether a statute violates it.  Today we do so by adopting the elements of 
the three-part Lemon test.98  We do this not because it is the federal 
constitutional standard, but rather because the elements of the Lemon test 
are a logical and reasonable method by which to determine whether a 
statutory scheme establishes religion.99  
And then, what I call the “I-heard-you-in-Robinette” passage: 
There is no reason to conclude that the Religion Clauses of the Ohio 
Constitution are coextensive with those in the United States Constitution, 
though they have at times been discussed in tandem.  The language of the 
Ohio provisions is quite different from the federal language. Accordingly, 
although we will not on this day look beyond the Lemon-Agostini100 
framework, neither will we irreversibly tie ourselves to it.  See Arnold v. 
Cleveland  [asserting that the Ohio Constitution is a document of 
independent force].  We reserve the right to adopt a different 
constitutional standard pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, whether because 
the federal constitutional standard changes or for any other relevant 
                                                                
94
“No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship against 
his consent, and no preference shall be given, by law, to any religious society. . . .”  OHIO 
CONST. art. I, § 7. 
95
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof. . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
96Simmons-Harris, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 4, 711 N.E.2d at 207. 
97Id. at 7-8, 711 N.E.2d at 210.  See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 
2000), rev’d, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). The school voucher program 
provided tuition assistance to needy children, allowing families to choose among participating 
schools that included private, public, religious and non-religious schools.  234 F.3d at 948.  On 
appeal, even though 96% of the students in the program enrolled in religiously affiliated 
schools, the U.S. Supreme Court held the program did not violate the Establishment Clause 
because schools were selected wholly as a result of truly independent choices by parents and 
students.  536 U.S. at  652.  
98Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
99Simmons-Harris, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 10, 711 N.E.2d at 211 (citations omitted). 
100Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13; Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223, 230-33 (1997). 
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reason.  We reiterate the reasoning discussed during our analysis of the 
federal constitutional standard, and although we now analyze pursuant to 
the Ohio Constitution, we not surprisingly reach the same conclusion.  We 
conclude that the School Voucher Program does not have an 
impermissible legislative purpose or effect and does not excessively 
entangle the state and religion.  The School Voucher Program does not 
violate Section 7, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.101 
So, even though the language in both state religion clauses is quite different from 
the federal First Amendment, in Simmons-Harris, the Ohio Supreme Court chose 
lockstep, but in a manner suggesting that it had learned its lesson in Robinette.  
Although the court did not even attempt any real separate state constitutional 
analysis, it left the door open for a “beyond lockstep” moment in the future.  That 
future moment arrived in 2000 in the persona of a prison guard with long hair.   
IV.  FREE EXERCISE 
In Humphrey v. Lane,102 the plaintiff was a Native American who wore his hair 
long as part of his practice of Native American spirituality.103  But that conflicted 
with the prison grooming policy.104  After Humphrey was told to cut his hair or be 
fired, he filed suit in state court raising a free exercise challenge to the policy.105  
Federal law at this point was to apply a rational basis test for religion-neutral laws 
that have an incidental effect of burdening religious practices.106  But the Ohio 
Supreme Court opted for a supplemental, or reactive posture, which shows it is 
getting bolder.  In this free exercise challenge, Ohio expressly rejected the federal 
test in favor of the stricter compelling state interest test.107  The opinion author is 
again Justice Pfeifer.  Although the court found the state had proven the grooming 
policy furthered a compelling state interest, it failed to prove the policy was the least 
restrictive means of furthering that interest.108  So Humphrey won his case, and was 
allowed to keep his long hair pinned under his cap.109  Although the court held that 
under the Ohio Constitution free exercise protection is broader than under the U.S. 
Constitution, there is little analysis underpinning this position.110  
                                                                
101Simmons-Harris, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 10, 711 N.E.2d at 211-12 (citations omitted).   
10289 Ohio St. 3d 62, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (2000). 
103Id. at 68-69, 728 N.E.2d at 1045. 
104Id. at 69, 728 N.E.2d at 1045. 
105Id. at 69, 728 N.E.2d at 1045. 
106Empl. Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
107Humphrey, 89 Ohio St. 3d at 68, 728 N.E.2d at 1045. 
108Id. at 70-71, 728 N.E.2d at 1047. 
109Id. at 69-71, 728 N.E.2d at 1046-47. 
110Id. at 68, 728 N.E.2d at 1045. 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/9
2004] JUDICIAL FEDERALISM MOVEMENT 503 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude with these observations.  While the Ohio Supreme Court has 
been part of the New Judicial Federalism movement now for a decade, I think the 
court is still struggling with the fundamentals.  It has gotten the concept but hasn’t 
really engaged in the kind of rigorous analysis the subject deserves.  Since we now 
have a court majority with a very different philosophy from the court that signed on 
to the New Judicial Federalism Movement during this last decade, it will be 
interesting to see in what areas of the law, if any, the court is willing to find greater 
protections under Ohio’s Constitution.  
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